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Abstract 
It is striking why the resource-rich States in India are income poor. This calls for analyzing 
the fiscal policy practices in the resource-rich new States, particularly the fiscal space created by 
the mining proceeds; and in turn what the fiscal space is used for. Inquiring the “use of mining 
fiscal space” has high policy relevance in India, against the backdrop of recent Mines and Minerals 
Development and Regulation (MMDR) Amendment Bill, 2015. Such policy imperatives are 
comparable to the global initiatives like “oil-to-cash policy”. This paper explores the plausible 
impacts of MMDR 2015 (9B), which stipulates a portion of mining royalty and auction proceeds 
to redress the resource curse. Though nebulous estimates from the coal auction proceeds are on 
board, ambiguity remains how the newly generated fiscal space would resolve spatial inequalities.  
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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MINING REGULATIONS 2015: 
SPATIAL INEQUALITY AND RESOURCE CURSE IN TWO NEW STATES, INDIA 
 
 
It is striking why the resource-rich States in India are income poor; and suffer from large 
deficits in social and economic development. Why the newly formed States in India – Chhattisgarh 
and Jharkhand - has failed to translate their natural resource abundance to economic growth and 
human development? As per the India Human Development Report 2011, Chhattisgarh was ranked 
last among all States in India, with an HDI of 0.358, against the national average of 0.467. 
Jharkhand also remains at bottom level in the human development with an HDI of 0.376.  This 
calls for analyzing the significance of fiscal policy practices in these resource-rich new States, with 
special reference to the fiscal space created by the mining revenues and in turn what the mining 
fiscal space is used for.  
Theoretically, finding a sustainable fiscal space for human development involves asking 
what the purpose of fiscal space is, the timeframe for the analytical framework, and the political 
economy context within which it is implemented (Roy, 2015). Specifically, to what extent do local 
jurisdictions benefit from mining proceeds? This question of “use of mining fiscal space” has high 
policy relevance in India against the backdrop of the recent Mining Industrial Policy - Mines and 
Minerals Development and Regulation (MMDR) Amendment Bill, 2015 - which states a provision 
for District Mineral Foundation (DMF) for linking mining royalty and auction proceeds to improve 
the quality of life of the local populace, primarily the tribals, and improving the social 
infrastructure of these mining districts.  
The “district” is taken as the unit of analysis of mining industrial regulation and 
development policy in India. Can this create regional disparities, as only a few districts in India 
contribute to mining regime?  If so, can DMF mining industrial policy create socio-economic 
inequalities? This paper analyses the effect of mining and resource abundance on socioeconomic 
outcomes at the district level, in retrospect, of two resource-rich new States in India, viz., 
Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand.   
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The paper is organized into seven sections. Section 1 presents a macro policy backdrop of 
new mining regulations and state capacity; while Section 2 analyses the fiscal fiat and royalty 
regimes.  Section 3 examines the effect of mining regulations on economic growth. Section 4 
analyses the plausible effects of MMDR 2015 on the socioeconomic outcomes at the district level, 
of two resource-rich new States in India, viz., Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand. Section 5 explores the 
reasons for resource curse while section 6 examines the recent Mining Industry Policy initiatives 
to address the problems of resource curse and spatial inequalities. Section 7 concludes.  
I.  STATE CAPACITY AND MINING REGULATIONS: A POLICY BACKDROP 
The drafting of regulations often reflect “state capacity”, which is the power of the state to 
raise the fiscal capacity (Besley, 2013, Skocpol, 1985, Besley and Persson, 2011). The natural 
resource reliance is a significant determinant of the state capacities, though the political economy 
play a major role in the link between the two (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001, Mann 1984, 
World Bank, 1992). In order to increase the investment in the mining sector and promote 
sustainable mining practices to adequately meet the requirements of the industry without 
sacrificing environmental concerns, the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulations) 
(MMDR) Act, 1957 had been amended. The new Act is named as The Mines and Minerals 
(Development and Regulation) (Amendment) Bill, 2015.  
MMDR 2015 has suggested a creation of District Mineral Funds (DMF) for the welfare of 
the project affected people. The new bill also provides greater decentralisation of power to States 
governments for allocation of resources. The amended Act under section 9(B) says that the State 
Governments shall establish a non-profit body called District Mineral Foundation (DMF) in all the 
mining affected districts. The objective of the DMF is to work for the interest and benefits of the 
persons and the areas affected by the mining operations in accordance with the State Government. 
The holder of a Mining Lease has to pay an annual amount to the DMF of the district for which 
the percentage of royalty to be paid may be prescribed by the Central Government in case of 
minerals other than minor minerals and prescribed by the State Government in case of minor 
minerals. In the earlier version of MMDR, it was suggested through profit sharing formula - 26 
per cent of profits from the coal miners and 100 per cent royalty equivalent money from other 
miners-, which has become controversial, and dropped in the present Bill.  However, the ambiguity 
remains about the new levies in addition to the existing mining taxes and royalty. 
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MMDR, 2015 proposed that  
9B. (1) In all districts affected by mining related operations, the State Government shall, by 
notification, establish a trust to be called the District Mineral Foundation, as a non-profit body.  
(2) The composition and functioning of the District Mineral Foundation shall be regulated in such 
manner as may be prescribed by the State Government.  
(3) The object of the District Mineral Foundation shall be to work for the interest and benefit of 
persons, or areas, affected by mining related operations in such manner as may be prescribed by 
the State Government.  
(4) The holder of a mining lease or a prospecting license-cum-mining lease shall pay annually to 
the District Mineral Foundation of the District in which the mining operations are carried on,—  
(a) in case of minerals other than minor minerals, such percentage of the royalty paid during the 
financial year as may be prescribed by the Central Government; and  
(b) in case of minor minerals, such amount as may be prescribed by the State Government; 
The new draft says, “for the purpose of granting a mining lease in respect of any notified 
minerals, the state government shall select, through auction by a method of competitive bidding, 
including e-auction, an applicant who satisfies the eligibility conditions.” So it cleared the way for 
the auction of iron ore and other non-coal minerals. Aiming to improve transparency in allocation 
and to get fair share of the value of minerals for the government, the new bill prescribed 
competitive bidding by auction for the allocation of mining leases. The proposed method has its 
roots in the National Mineral Policy 2005 (Hoda Committee), constituted by erstwhile Planning 
Commission, Government of India. It says that “the scheme envisages that the successful bidder 
will conduct the exploration and prospecting work at his own risk and cost. In case there is any 
find, he will have to abide by the bid conditions which could be in the form of a production share, 
or a payment linked to the royalty payable etc.” To look at the issue of illegal mining, the amended 
act made the offence of illegal mining a cognizable offence. The bill enabled the State 
Governments to set special courts for trial of offences under the act. The Act empowered the 
Central Government to frame rules for prescribing the timelines for the different stages in 
processing the application for grants of mineral concessions and their renewals. 
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II. FISCAL SPACE FROM MINING: REGIME SHIFTS AND ROYALTY 
PROCEEDS 
Mining taxation regime of iron and coal in India is in a state of flux. Particularly, the current 
methodology of royalty estimation for mining sector requires a relook. The mining royalty regime 
in India is onerous. India has one of highest royalty rates in the world. Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand 
have the significant share of iron and coal deposits in India. Though there has been an increasing 
trend in the regime shift in mining royalty away from the tonnage royalty regime to ad valorem, 
the rationalization of rates to internationally competitive rates has not yet materialized 
(Chakraborty, 2015). Every three years, the royalty rates are revised upwards in India. In ferrous 
royalty regime, though there has been a shift from tonnage to ad valorem, the base estimation 
suffers from discretion in deciding the grade content (ʎ1,2,3…n in the following formula) of the 
extracted ore in arriving at royalty calculations. 
RROM = [ʎ1,2,3…n ROM] * ϒore 
where 
RROM  =  Royalty revenue from metal contained in Fe ore 
ʎ1,2,3…n  =  Grade percent of Metal in the different types of extracted iron ore  
ROM  =  Tonnage of Run of Mine (ROM) Ore Treated 
ϒore  =  Prevailing Royalty Rate on the Fe ore 
There is a regime shift in ferrous royalty since 2012. Prior to 2012, the Fe royalty was 
estimated on the basis of tonnage method. The grade percent was different for ore lumps and fines, 
and also within each category. The recent royalty rate for iron is as high as 15 per cent ad valorem 
of national benchmark (IBM) price. The mining royalty proceeds can be obtained from the Finance 
Accounts data. 
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RROM = [ʎ * ROM] * [αPIBM] * ϒore 
RROM  =  Royalty revenue from metal contained in the ore 
ʎ  =  Grade percent of Metal in the extracted ore  
ROM  =  Tonnage of Run of Mine (ROM) Ore Treated 
PIBM  =  IBM Fe Prices 
ϒore  =  Prevailing Royalty Rate on the Fe ore 
We have explored two data sources to arrive at the fiscal proceeds from mining sector: 
Finance Accounts and individual State Budgets. As the Finance Accounts data do not contain the 
mining proceeds at disaggregated levels, we have explored the State Budget documents to extract 
the disaggregated budget heads related to mining using a recent methodology of "budget tagging2”.  
The budget tagging analysis intends to identify the budget codes that are relevant to mining actions; 
and report such revenue heads related to mining operations. However, the negative inferences from 
this exercise reinforced that the fiscal space from mining to State exchequer is negligible, less than 
10 per cent, in both new states and no relevant budget heads with appropriations are available at 
disaggregated levels in the State Budgets, other than what is reported in Finance Accounts.   
Methodologically, we have used an encompassing criteria for selecting the “mining tags” 
in the revenue budget of the States, incorporating different phases of mining operations, viz., 
prospecting (which involves reconnaissance and detailed exploration), development and operation.  
For instance, this analysis defines mining revenues from different phases of mining, viz., (i) 
reconnaissance permit fee, (ii) prospecting fee, (iii) dead rent, (iv) royalties and some other levies 
are levied at the different stages of a mining operation. However, the inference from the budget 
tagging analysis revealed that the time series data on revenue from tax and nontax sources other 
than mining royalty and fees is not available in the budget documents3.   
                                                          
2 The budget tagging is a recent methodology used to prepare climate responsive budgeting (CRB). However in 
CRB, the tagging is confined to expenditure budgets.  
33 The taxes (direct and indirect) collected from mining firms are unavailable in budget documents. We have 
therefore collated the details of direct and indirect taxes paid by the mining companies from the PROWESS CMIE 
dataset. 
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We have therefore decided to use Finance Accounts data, as the disaggregation exercise 
using the budget tagging methodology to identify the “mining tags” left us with insignificant 
additional inferences.  This disaggregated exploration is also not helpful to analyse the link 
between fiscal proceeds from mining and its utilisation on local area development and 
rehabilitation. There is no proceeds under mining in the State budgets, earmarked so far to redress 
spatial or human inequalities. This is not to understate the relevance of budget tagging 
methodology, all we wanted to highlight is the irrelevance of this methodology in identifying 
mining tags. However, the new policy formulation based on DMF in MMDR Act 2015 is in anvil 
to link the mining proceeds to the benefit of local populace, and the DMF provisions could be a 
plausible budget head to study such links in future.  
Figure 1: STRUCTURE OF OWN REVENUE: CHHATTISGARH 
 
Source: Govt of India, Finance Accounts, Chhattisgarh (2012-13) 
 
Using the time series data from Finance Accounts, we deciphered that in Chhattisgarh, 
mining revenue constitute around 18 per cent of state’s own revenue.  Within the nontax revenue, 
mining proceeds form 68 per cent of own non-tax revenue in 2012-13. However, the own non tax 
forms only 26 per cent of total own revenue (Figure 1).  These ratios need interpretation in the 
context that 40 per cent of State total revenue receipts constitute of central transfers (Figure 2).   
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Figure 2: STRUCTURE OF REVENUE: CHHATTISGARH 
 
Source : Govt of India, Finance Accounts, Chhattisgarh (2012-13) 
 
Linking of fiscal proceeds to the ‘use of proceeds’ is difficult to map, as it is not yet 
earmarked for  any specific purpose, though MMDR 2015 gives indications of linking it through 
creating DMF. However, broadly we can suggest that mining royalty finances only 11.55 % of 
revenue expenditure in Chhattisgarh, in 2012-13. 
 
Figure 3: STRUCTURE OF OWN REVENUE: JHARKHAND 
 
Source : Govt of India, Finance Accounts, Jharkhand (2012-13) 
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Jharkhand is the country’s most mineral‐intensive state, with mining and quarrying 
accounting for around 88 per cent of the own non tax revenue of the State.   However, the own non 
tax revenue forms only 30 per cent of the own revenue kit (Figure 3).  Mining royalty finances 
only 13.43 % of revenue expenditure in Jharkhand. The detail analysis of fiscal profile of mining 
sector of the mineral rich states in India can be obtained from Chakraborty (2015).  
 
III. EFFECT OF MINING REGIME ON ECONOMIC GROWTH 
The onerous mining taxation and royalty regime can have repercussions on economic 
growth. The contribution of mining sector to the economic growth has been on the decline. The 
industrial sector in India consists of three sub-sectors: (i) manufacturing, (ii) mining and quarrying 
and (iii) electricity, gas and water supply. During the year 2013-14, the share of the industry sector 
in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was about 26.1 per cent and the ‘mining and quarrying’ sub-
sector had a contribution of 1.9 per cent (Table 1). Mining sector provides basic and strategic raw 
materials for the production of a wide range of industrial and consumer products, military and 
transport equipment, infrastructure, energy, communications and many other essential services.  
Table 1:  SHARE OF MINING SECTOR IN GDP (PER CENT) 
Sector 1999-2000 2007-08 2012-13 2013-14(P) 
Agriculture & allied 23.2 16.8 13.9 13.9 
Industry 26.8 28.7 27.3 26.1 
1. Mining  and quarrying 3 2.5 2 1.9 
2. Manufacturing 15 16.1 15.8 14.9 
3. Registered Manufacturing 9.2 10.7 11.2 NA 
4. Unregistered Manufacturing 5.8 5.4 4.5 NA 
Services  50 54.4 58.8 59.9 
1. Trade, hotels, transport, and communication 21.2 25.9 26.9 26.4 
2. Financing, insurance, real estate, and business 
services 14.5 16.1 19.1 20.6 
3. Community, social, and personal services 14.4 12.4 12.8 12.9 
Source: Economic Survey 2013-14.  
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The contribution of mining sector to the regional economies has also been on the decline 
(Figure 4). The declining trend of share of mining sector in the GSDP across States affects the 
manufacturing sector of the country. The Figure 4 revealed that Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh are 
consistent performers since 2004-05 with an average contribution of around 10% between 2004-
05 and 2013-14. Goa is on a declining trend since 2009-10, despite having significant contribution 
from the sector between 2004-05 and 2008-09. Odisha is also on a declining trend since 2010-11, 
despite having significant contribution from the sector between 2004-05 and 2009-10.   
Figure 4: SHARE OF MINING AND QUARRYING IN GSDP-STATE-WISE (2004-05 PRICES) 
 
Source: CSO, Govt of India (various years) 
After the bifurcation of States, the new States gained in terms of mining than the parental 
states in case of both Bihar-Jharkhand and Madhya Pradesh-Chhattisgarh. However, empirical 
evidences do not suggest that creation of new states led to any distinctive fiscal agency, in terms 
of enhancing the fiscal autonomy from mining proceeds as both States rely around half of their 
revenue from intergovernmental fiscal transfers. The Figure 5 revealed that Bihar has not seen a 
change in share since 2004-05, i.e. 0.1% of GSDP, while Figure 6 revealed that Madhya Pradesh 
is on a declining trend since 2010-11, despite having significant contribution from the sector 
between 2004-05 and 2009-10. Both Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh – the new States – gained in 
terms of mining compared to the parent states.  
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Figure 5: MINING TO GSDP RATIO:  BIFURCATED MADHYA PRADESH AND CHHATTISGARH 
 
Source: CSO, Govt of India (various years) 
 
Figure 3: MINING TO GSDP RATIO:  BIFURCATED BIHAR AND JHARKHAND 
 
Source: CSO, Govt of India (various years) 
The contribution of mining to GSDP at 10 per cent is comparatively higher, in terms of 
intra-national (with other mineral rich States in India) and international comparison. The cross 
country evidence revealed that resource-rich contributes only below 10 per cent of GSDP with 
Chile (6 %), Australia (5.9%) and South Africa (5.3 %) in 2010.  
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Figure 4: CROSS-COUNTRY RATIOS: MINING TO GDP (%) 
 
Source: Strategy Paper, Ministry of Mines, Govt of India, 2011 
 
The strategy paper of Ministry of Mines (2011) noted that the proceeds from mining in the 
two new States – Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand would be comparatively more than other mineral 
rich States and forecasted that contribution from this sector could go up to 20.0 and 14.1 per cent 
respectively by 2025. 
 
IV. EFFECT OF MINING ON SOCIOECONOMIC OUTCOMES: DISTRICT LEVEL 
ANALYSIS 
The empirical analysis of impact of mining activity on the socioeconomic development of 
the region is an elusive area of research. While several studies analyzed the resource curse problem 
from national economy’s perspective, a few studies have attempted to look for the problem of 
resource-curse at the disaggregated level of district. A Policy Research Working Paper of the 
World Bank (Loayza et al, 2013) shows that mining activity in Peru has had a positive impact on 
local communities in terms of higher economic growth and a better performance on human 
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development indicators. The analysis tries to compare the performance of a mining district with a 
non-mining district in the same mineral producing province and non-mining in the non-mineral 
producing province. The analysis reveals higher inequalities across districts stemming from the 
relatively better performance of the producing district, which counteracts the benefits and becomes 
a potential source of societal tensions. The alleviated poverty levels persist despite the 
redistributive programmes to uplift the local communities.  
Another study is in the Indian context that attempts to do a district-level analysis of the 
Maoist conflict in India (Hoelscher et al, 2012). The major finding of their study is that the districts 
with the highest percentage of SC/ST population are the most affected by Maoist operations. Most 
socio-economic and government capacity factors only marginally explain the conflict issue. The 
relationship between mining and violence is observed to be positive, but is weak. The findings also 
revealed that it is not a lack of development per se that triggers conflict, but the development that 
disregards the interests of the most vulnerable inhabitants of land and provides no safeguard 
against corruption or other illegal and unjust practices.  The extensive literature on civil conflict 
cites strong illustrations of civil conflicts originating from appropriation of rents from natural 
resources that impedes economic growth and severely impairs the economic and socio-political 
environment of the country in the long-run (Ross, 2004a, 2004b; de Soysa and Binningsbø, 2009).  
Mapping the incidence of mineral resource holding and the six World Governance 
Indicators - voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government 
ineffectiveness, regulatory quality, control of corruption and rule of law -  across the regions of 
the globe, one is bound to see striking overlaps. A significant number of resource-abundant Sub-
Saharan African, certain Latin American and Middle Eastern nations are placed in the lowest 
percentile on all six indicators. Empirical evidences across globe suggests that it seems to be a case 
where the availability of natural wealth has become the main source of economic and political 
instability; of foreign private and public competitiveness; and of rent-seeking behaviour in 
vulnerable states, with all its accompanying features of attempts at illegal extraction, leading to 
soaring poverty levels.  
Against this backdrop we carry out our preliminary analysis of the socio-economic impacts 
of mining in the two newly formed resource rich states of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand. Mineral 
profile for the states of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand as on April 1, 2014 for coal and as on April 1, 
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2010 for other minerals are given in Table 2 and 3. Juxtaposing and analyzing the datasets on 
mineral wealth along with Table 3 on growth and human development indicators of the two states 
brings out an interesting finding that the resource-rich states perform badly on the growth and 
development. Presently, both the states have an HDI value lower than the national average on all 
three dimensions- education, income and health and they suffer an average loss of 35% and 33% 
in HDI due to inequality, respectively.  
Table 2: MINERAL PROFILE, CHHATTISGARH 
Mineral Total resources in Chhattisgarh 
Share of the state 
as a percent of all 
India reserves 
Coal 52533 (million tn) 17.42 
Iron ore  3291824 ('000 tn) 18.40 
Limestone  8959446 ('000 tn) 5.15 
Dolomite  846682 ('000 tn) 10.95 
Tin ore  29800703 (tn) 35.59 
Tin metal 15486.63 (tn) 15.14 
Note: (as on April 1, 2014 for coal and as on April 1, 2010 for other minerals) 
Source: Indian Minerals Yearbook 2013 and Coal Directory of India 2013-14 
 
Table 3: MINERAL PROFILE, JHARKHAND 
Mineral  Total resources in Jharkhand Share of the state as a percent of all India reserves 
(%) 
Coal 80716 (‘million tn) 26.76 
Iron ore  4596620 ('000 tn) 25.71 
Copper ore 288126 ('000 tn) 18.49 
Bauxite  146323 ('000 tn) 4.21 
Graphite  12910869 (tn) 7.48 
Kyanite  5708533 (tn) 5.53 
Note: (as on April 1, 2010 for other minerals) 
Source: Indian Minerals Yearbook 2013 and Coal Directory of India 2013-14 
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Table 4: DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS: CHHATTISGARH AND JHARKHAND 
 Indicators Chhattisgarh Jharkhand India 
1. Total Population (In Millions) 26 33 1210 
2. Net domestic Product (at factor cost) (Rs crores) [For 
state) Gross Domestic Product (at factor cost) (Rs crores) 
(For India)] 
70309 63297 4493743 
3. Sex ratio (females per 1000 males) 991 947 940 
4. Literacy rate (%) 71.04 67.63 74.04 
5. Human Development Index (HDI) 0.358 0.376 0.467 
6. Gender Related Development Index (GDI) 0.542 0.558 0.590 
7. Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) 0.464 0.435 0.495 
8. Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index Value 
(IHDI) 
0.291 0.308 0.343 
9. Poverty Headcount Ratio (%) 48.7 39.1 29.8 
10. Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) 0.367 0.441 0.283 
11. Prevalence of Underweight Children under 5 years of 
age (%) 
47.6 57.1 42.5 
Source: 1, 3-4 - Census of India 2011;  
2- RBI Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy and Economic Survey of India 2010-11;  
5- India Human Development Report 2011, IAMR and Planning Commission;  
6-7-Gendering Human Development Indices: Gendering Human Development Indices: Recasting the 
Gender Development Index and Gender Empowerment Measure for India, Ministry of Women and Child 
Development, GOI; 
8- Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index for India’s States 2011, UNDP;  
9- Tendulkar Committee Report 2009, Planning Commission;  
10- MPI data and updates for 2011, OPHI; 
11- India State Hunger Index 2009, IFPRI 
 
Despite being endowed with rich reserves of minerals, the states have not been able to 
utilize its resource wealth to set the trajectory of growth and development. In fact, a closer look at 
the indicators reveals that the two states are among the poorest performing states in India on human 
development. But we need to study the data at a district-disaggregated level in order to find the 
impact of mining on socio-economic outcomes. 
The district-level data on four indicators namely, effective literacy rate, infant mortality 
rate, total fertility rate, and institutional deliveries, are listed below in Table 5 and 6, for the 16 
districts of Chhattisgarh and 18 districts of Jharkhand respectively. So for the purpose of finding 
the worst pockets, those districts have been selected that perform worse than the respective state 
figures. Not only does this reflect the intra-state spatial inequalities but also brings to the table the 
dire need of policy measures to alleviate the existing gaps on the development in order to achieve 
inclusive growth. Those figures are highlighted under each indicator where the performance is 
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worse than the respective state average. We observed that more than half of the districts in each 
state lag far behind on development where the infrastructure for the provision of basic health and 
education facilities seems to be in a shambles. Extending the analysis further, the districts with the 
highest share of Scheduled Tribe (ST) population (highlighted figures under last columns of Table 
5 and 6) are also seen to be the districts which are the among the worst performers on the above 
mentioned four indicators, with an exception of the district of Bastar and Korba in Chhattisgah, 
and the districts of Ranchi and Purbi (East) Singhbhum in Jharkhand. The ST population, mostly 
rural dwellers, lives in relatively isolated and inaccessible areas and is highly deprived and 
marginalized. In fact, eight of the tribal groups of the state of Jharkhand namely; Asur, Birhor, 
Birajia, Korwa, Savar, Pahariya (Baiga), Mal Pahariya and Souriya Pahariya have been declared 
as particularly vulnerable tribal Groups (PTGs). They live in small, dispersed and inaccessible 
habitations (Economic Survey of Jharkhand 2013-14). The districts identified are mineral-
abundant and the following table shows their mineral wealth profile.  
Table 5: DISTRICT-WISE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS, CHHATTISGARH 
Districts 
Infant 
Mortality 
Rate (IMR) 
Total 
Fertility 
Rate 
(TFR) 
Effective 
Literacy 
Rate (%) 
Institutional 
Delivery 
(%) 
% of ST 
Population 
Bastar 40 2.5 66.3 67.1 11.9 
Bilaspur 38 2.9 78.8 28.2 6.4 
Dantewada 44 2.7 52.3 49.7 5.2 
Dhamtari 47 2.5 84.3 52.2 2.7 
Durg 35 2.3 83.5 39.9 5.1 
Janjgir-
Champa 46 2.6 77.1 27.1 2.4 
Jashpur 56 2.8 71.3 37.8 6.8 
Kanker 46 2.3 81.4 68.4 5.3 
Kawardha 57 3.6 72.3 23.8 2.1 
Korba 48 2.5 79.7 42.6 6.3 
Koriya 52 2.3 74.8 40.1 3.9 
Mahasamund 57 2.8 76 49.5 3.6 
Raigarh 55 2.5 75.8 42.2 6.5 
Raipur 45 2.9 78.6 34.5 6.1 
Rajnandgaon 49 2.8 81.7 43.5 5.2 
Surguja 50 3.2 68.7 32.0 16.6 
Chhattisgarh 46 2.7 76.4 39.5 100.0 
Source: Annual Health Survey 2012-13 Factsheet, Chhattisgarh, and State Primary Census Abstract 2011 
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Table 6: DISTRICT-WISE  HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS, JHARKHAND 
Districts 
Infant 
Mortality 
Ratio (IMR) 
Total 
Fertility 
Rate (TFR) 
Effective 
Literacy 
Rate 
(%) 
Institutional 
Delivery 
(%) 
% of ST 
Population 
Bokaro 28 2.6 79.0 54.8 5.90 
Chatra 42 3.0 69.9 35.6 1.05 
Deoghar 31 2.5 72.0 39.0 4.18 
Dhanbad 26 2.7 79.4 52.0 5.38 
Dumka 45 3.0 66.7 28.8 13.19 
Garhwa 33 3.0 67.4 39.2 2.34 
Giridih 28 2.5 69.2 35.1 5.50 
Godda 54 3.0 63.3 31.2 6.45 
Gumla 45 3.5 70.9 45.7 16.32 
Hazaribagh 29 2.3 76.5 54.2 2.81 
Kodarma 27 2.7 73.9 54.9 0.16 
Lohardaga 53 3.7 74.0 54.7 6.07 
Pakaur 52 3.7 59.3 27.7 8.75 
Palamu 40 2.9 69.4 39.3 4.19 
Pashchimi 
Singhbhum 53 3.1 67.6 38.5 23.36 
Purbi 
Singhbhum 25 2.2 78.7 70.0 15.10 
Ranchi 30 2.7 82.3 64.2 24.07 
Sahibganj 52 3.0 63.5 29.5 7.12 
Jharkhand 36 2.7 73.3 46.2 100.00 
Source: Annual Health Survey 2012-13 Factsheet, Jharkhand, and State Primary Census Abstract 2011 
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Table 7: MINERAL WEALTH PROFILE FOR A FEW SELECT DISTRICTS OF THE TWO STATES 
 Highest ST 
Population Mineral wealth 
 Highest ST 
Population Mineral wealth 
C
h
h
a
tt
is
g
a
r
h
 
Surguja 
bauxite, coal, 
dolomite 
J
h
a
rk
h
a
n
d
 
Pashchimi Singhbhum 
bauxite, china clay, 
fire clay, iron ore, 
quartz, limestone, 
manganese ore, 
kyanite 
Bastar 
bauxite, iron ore, 
dolomite, 
limestone, granite, 
tin, garnet, marble 
Gumla 
bauxite, iron ore, 
granite 
Jashpur bauxite, quartz Dumka 
bauxite, china clay, 
fire clay, quartz, 
graphite, felspar 
Raigarh 
bauxite, coal, 
dolomite, 
limestone, quartz, 
china clay, fire clay 
Pakaur coal, bentonite 
Bilaspur 
bauxite, dolomite, 
limestone, fire clay 
Sahibganj 
china clay, quartz, 
bentonite 
Korba bauxite, coal Godda 
coal, fire clay, 
quartz, granite 
Source: Indian Minerals Yearbook 2013 
 
This reveals a preliminary evidence that the extensive mining activities carried out in the 
districts have not yielded socio-economic gains to the districts and the finding is contrary from the 
results given in literature that supports higher economic performance for the mining districts 
(Loayza et al, 2013) and the reason for the same can be the complex interplay of economic, social 
and political factors operational in the Indian context. We attempt to explore these reasons in the 
next section. 
V. WHY RESOURCE CURSE? 
The finding in the preceding section is certainly an illustration of what is termed as 
‘resource curse’ i.e. the abundance of resources does not translate into improved growth and 
development of the regions endowed with the mineral wealth. The reasons that can be identified 
for the abysmal performance of the resource-rich districts could be inadequate investment in 
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building up the requisite physical and human infrastructure, the presence of crony capitalism that 
perpetuates corruption and siphons resources off the state, and the persisting problem of “conflict”.  
Exploring further into these reasons show that the problem faced by the states is resource 
curse and, to be more specific, resource (mis)appropriation. It is also significant to analyse the 
effectiveness of public spending on health and education in the state and also for rural development 
especially when the states have a significantly high rural population, around 76 per cent for both 
the states (for details, see Economic Survey 2013, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh).  
V.1: Crony Capitalism 
Conceptually, crony capitalism is a ‘regulatory-capture collusion’ (Bo, 2006; Albino et al, 
2013). A phenomenon plaguing the Indian economy, the mining sector in particular, is crony 
capitalism. Despite efforts to bring increased accountability and transparency to functioning at all 
levels of the economy, the official announcement of the recent losses to the extent of Rs 1.86 lakh 
crores in allocation of coal blocks since 1993 (Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General 
(CAG) of India). This is a reflection of the extent of crony capitalism. Not only are rules and laws 
completely overlooked or compromised with, such practices increase the extent of elite capture 
through rampant rent-seeking. The wealth from such rent-seeking activities is then used to distort 
decisions in the allocation of resources, in a lure of potentially higher wealth generation from such 
allocations in future.  
In the context of the mining sector, the recent scandal in allocation of 216 coal blocks since 
1993 points to the state of affairs where principles were sacrificed in distributing national wealth, 
to meet the vested interests. The mineral under scrutiny was coal, which serves more than half of 
the electricity needs of the country and is important in manufacture of cement, steel and other 
manufacturing products. What is even striking is that despite holding substantial reserves of coal, 
the country continues to rely on imports to an extent of 20-25 per cent in recent years, in order to 
meet its total requirements (Ministry of Coal, Government of India).  
Even though efforts were made to allocate coal blocks in a transparent manner through 
open competitive bidding in public auctions, the end results (now exposed) amounted to severe 
losses to the exchequer (Reports from the Special CBI court judgment, 2015). Stemming from 
such unfair corporate practices is illegal mining activities being conducted in the resource-
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abundant sates of Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Odisha, West 
Bengal and Maharashtra. The revenues generated are funding the armed insurgency operations 
(Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India) while also causing loss in coal production that 
has a direct bearing on in infrastructure development in the country. An annual loss to the extent 
of 3 mt is suffered by Coal India Limited (CIL) due to mining activities interrupted by Naxal 
violence4.  
V.2:  Conflict  
The logic of accumulation by dispossession is one of the plausible reasons for the problem 
of “conflict” in the newly created states of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh.  The roots of the problem 
can be traced to the displacement of local inhabitants of land endowed with rich mineral resources, 
without due compensation and provision of decent livelihood opportunities.  
 
Mining-induced displacement and resettlement (MIDR) poses major risks to societal 
sustainability and this was getting increasingly recognized in policy circles. To cite World Bank 
(2001), “(i)nvoluntary resettlement under development projects, if unmitigated, often gives rise to 
severe economic, social and environmental risks: productive systems are dismantled; people face 
impoverishment when their productive assets or income sources are lost; people are relocated to 
environments where their productive skills may be less applicable and the competition for 
resources greater; community institutions and social networks are weakened; kin groups are 
dispersed; and cultural identity, traditional authority, and the potential for mutual help are 
diminished or lost”. Table 8 presents a snapshot of the fatalities reported from Naxal conflict in 
the period 2008 to 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 Reports from Coal India Limited 
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Table 8: STATE-WISE DATA ON CONFLICT, 2008- 2012 
 
States 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
I D I D I D I D I D 
Chhattisgarh 620 242 529 432 625 426 465 238 370 147 
Jharkhand 484 207 742 239 501 172 517 198 480 170 
Bihar 164 73 232 72 307 97 316 63 166 44 
Odisha 103 101 266 67 218 79 192 53 171 45 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
92 46 66 18 100 24 54 9 67 13 
Maharashtra 68 22 154 93 94 49 109 54 134 41 
West Bengal 35 26 255 158 350 258 92 45 6 0 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
7 0 1 0 7 1 8 0 11 0 
Uttar Pradesh 4 0 8 2 6 1 1 0 1 0 
Others 14 4 5 0 5 0 6 1 8 0 
Total 1591 721 2258 1081 2213 1107 1760 661 1408 460 
Note: (I: Incidents, D: Deaths) 
Source: Government of India (2009-2013), Ministry of Home Affairs. 
Though the incidences and deaths in absolute numbers have been on a decline over the 
years (increased deployment of police personnel, willful surrender of Maoists in the recent times, 
etc.), the numbers deserve seriousness from all quarters. In the four years from 2008-12, over 8000 
incidents with more than 4000 deaths have transpired as a result of this armed insurgency. The 
states of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand are the most affected by Maoist activities as they are also the 
states with the highest share of mineral wealth. In continuation with Table 10, Table 11 and 12 
present the findings for Maoist conflict in the states of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand that are 
adversely inflicted with Naxalism.  
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Table 11: CONFLICT IN CHHATTISGARH, INCIDENTS AND MORTALITY: 2009-2013 
Years Incidents 
Civilians  
killed 
SecurityForce 
personnel  
killed 
LeftWing 
Extremists  
killed 
Total  
killed 
2009 529 163 127 142 432 
2010 625 171 172 83 426 
2011 465 124 80 34 238 
2012 370 63 46 38 147 
2013 353 66 44 38 148 
Source: Government of India (2009-2013), Ministry of Home Affairs. 
 
Table 12: CONFLICT IN JHARKHAND: INCIDENTS AND MORTALITY, 2009-2013 
Years Incidents 
Civilians 
killed 
Security Force 
personnel killed 
LeftWing 
Extremists killed 
Total killed 
2009 742 140 68 31 239 
2010 501 132 25 15 172 
2011 517 149 33 16 198 
2012 480 134 29 7 170 
2013 383 120 30 12 162 
Source: Government of India (2009-2013), Ministry of Home Affairs. 
 
A district-level analysis of the conflict (over ground and massive underground operations) 
are given in Figure 5 and 6.  A lot of the districts with the highest fatalities are in fact the ones 
identified in the preceding section which were among the poorest performers on most human 
development indicators and also had a relatively higher share of the ST population. Of the total 
conflicts in Chhattisgarh, 44.44 per cent occurred in district Sukma (in South Bastar region) in 
2013 (Figure 5). Similarly, in Jharkhand, out of total conflicts in 2013, 21 per cent occurred in 
Gumla and 26 per cent occurred in Latehar. The findings on conflict from figures 5 and 6 are 
consistent with the finding in literature the strongest correlates of Maoist violence are those 
districts where ST populations form the highest percentages of population (Hoelscher et al, 2012). 
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Figure 5: Conflict Mortality in Chhattisgarh, District-wise Analysis (in %): 2013 
 
Source: Government of India (2013), Ministry of Home Affairs. 
Figure 6: Conflict Mortality in Jharkhand, District-wise Analysis (in %): 2013 
 
Source: Government of India (2013), Ministry of Home Affairs. 
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It also validates our argument that in the absence of a judicious public policy, the resource 
abundance becomes a cause of distress and manifests into incidences of civil conflicts. Increased 
mining operations fuels further conflicts by aggravating the existing problems. 
VI. RECENT MINING INDUSTRIAL POLICY (MMDR 2015) TO RESOLVE 
RESOURCE CURSE 
The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015 stipulates creation 
of fiscal space to resolve the resource curse. Specifically, the section 9(B) of the Act states that, in 
any district affected by mining related operations, the State Government shall, establish District 
Mineral Foundation (DMF) with the objective of working for benefit of persons, and areas affected 
by mining operations.  
As mentioned in section II of the paper, to ensure that the mining district gets its due share, the 
Act mandates the holder of a mining lease to pay to the DMF, in addition to the royalty, an amount 
which is equivalent to such percentage of the royalty paid, not exceeding one-third of royalty. 
Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand are one of the few states where contribution of mining sector to the 
GSDP is relatively higher than other states and also expected to increase in future (Strategy Paper 
for Ministry of Mines, 2011). MMDR 2015 also stipulates that the proceeds from coal e-auctioning 
should also be linked to DMF. There are ambiguities regarding the process of linking the fiscal 
space generated from coal auctions to redress spatial inequalities. However, the MMDR 2015 
policy announcements call for creating fiscal space and utilizing it to solve the problem of resource 
curse5.  
VI.1: Nascent Estimates of Coal Auction Proceeds  
The Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Act, 2015 has been implemented and aims at creating more 
fiscal space for the mining sector. Three rounds of coal auctions have been completed in India 
                                                          
55 Pursuant to the judgments, guidelines were laid down for e-auction of Schedule II and Schedule III coal mines. 
Schedule II coal mines are 42 of the 204 cancelled blocks (redefined as Schedule I coal blocks/mines) that are 
‘Producing’ and ‘Ready to produce’ coal mines. Schedule III coal mines are the other 32 substantially developed of 
the Schedule I coal mines, meant for specified end-use, and the Central Government may add any other Schedule I 
coal mine for the purposes of specified end-use in this category, in public interest (for details, see The Coal Mines 
(Special provisions) Act, 2015).  The Coal Auction Methodology for coal blocks is followed for the two sectors 
namely, Regulated Sectors and Non-Regulated Sectors (for details, see Approach paper, Auctions, Government of 
India , 2015 ; and Standard Tender Document, Ministry of Coal, Government of India, 2015).  
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recently and significant revenue has been generated from the new e-auction process of coal. The 
nascent estimates from coal auctioning are on board, though nebulous estimates (Figure 7).  
 
Figure 7: Nascent Coal e-Auction Estimates (First and Second rounds), 2015 
  
Source: Coal Ministry, Government of India (2015) 
 
There is considerable ambiguity of how these proceeds would appear in the State government 
budgets next year, and therefore further analysis based on these new coal mining proceeds would 
be carried out ex-post to the next budget cycle. However, a preliminary estimate of the state-wise 
share in coal auctions from the first two rounds of e-auctions are presented in Table 13, collated 
from the documents published by Ministry of Coal, Government of India6.  
 
 
 
                                                          
6 It is reported that from the third round where only 3 out of the 10 planned mines were e-auctioned, a total of Rs. 
4364 Crores is expected to have been added to government’s revenue (The Hindu, August 14, 2015). 
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Table 13: NASCENT ESTIMATES: STATE-WISE DISTRIBUTION (%) OF COAL MINING AUCTION 
PROCEEDS, 2015 
States 
e-auction proceeds 
to host state 
Royalty proceeds 
to host state 
Upfront payment 
(10% of intrinsic 
value) 
Total 
proceeds 
Chhattisgarh 32.77 29.57 23.30 32.34 
Jharkhand 23.48 23.43 27.10 23.49 
Madhya Pradesh 20.73 18.49 11.01 20.41 
Odisha 15.67 18.79 24.67 16.09 
West Bengal 6.10 8.02 12.92 6.37 
Maharashtra 1.25 1.69 1.00 1.31 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: Coal Ministry, Government of India (2015) 
As is brought out clearly from the Table 13, the six coal-rich states, especially 
Chhattisgarh7 and Jharkhand, are expected to benefit significantly from the proceeds of coal 
auctions. This expanded fiscal space from coal auction proceeds can contribute in reducing the 
social infrastructure deficit of the states. While the e-auction procedure has so far been transparent 
and fetched a fair amount of revenue to the government, there have been complaints regarding 
“cartelization” in bidding.  
India has adopted the e-auction route that is practiced in other countries including USA and 
Indonesia. However, as India has onerous royalty regime and one of the highest royalty rates in 
the world, linking the auction procedure to royalty can be detrimental to the competitiveness of 
the sector and in turn revenue argumentation to the State exchequer in the long run.  
Having said that, the policy initiative to link the fiscal space from mining proceeds to the 
spatial and human development is a positive step to redress the inequalities, and for inclusive 
development process. This is theoretically comparable to the “oil-to-cash policy” initiative 
implemented in Uganda (Moss and Majerowicz, 2013). In Uganda, a certain proportion of the 
                                                          
7 Of the three blocks successfully auctioned, Chhattisgarh’s Bhaskarpara mine is expected to fetch Rs.712 Crores to 
the State. 
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government receipts from oil revenues are transferred instantly to the bank accounts of families 
via mobile network, after deducting a small tax share. The aim is to create a participatory approach 
whereby oil becomes a common property and an active constituency of citizens is created. And 
international cross-country studies have strong evidence that such revenue proceeds linked to 
redress capability deprivation are usually spent on healthcare, education and opening of small 
enterprises.  
 
VII. CONCLUSION  
We examined the political economy context of the newly generated fiscal space from e-
auction mining proceeds in India and its intended use to redress the resource curse problem. Such 
policy imperatives are comparable to the global initiatives like recent “oil-to-cash policy”. Within 
the constraints of data paucity, our analysis cautions that existing roadmap of DMF (MMDR, 
2015) to plough back a portion of royalty and fresh e-auction mining proceeds exclusively to the 
mining districts may exacerbate spatial inequalities.  
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